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In both the theory and practice of international relations, sovereignty has assumed a 
paramount place. Not only is the notion of sovereignty  a central pillar of 
contemporary scholarship, but political elites throughout the world have frequently 
acted in ways that appeared consciously intended to consolidate its place in domestic 
and international affairs; hardly surprising, given that the position and power of such 
elites, especially in the developing world, was partly dependent on the continuity of 
this singular concept. And yet, for all sovereignty’s undoubted continuing importance 
and the crucial historical role it has assumed for several centuries, its empirical basis 
and thus its theoretical standing looks less certain than ever before. A number of 
increasingly influential processes – conveniently subsumed under the rubric of 
‘globalisation’ – are systematically undermining the foundations of national 
sovereignty and raising questions about the capacity of policymakers to act 
autonomously or effectively within national jurisdictions. The erosion of a discrete 
and relatively autonomous domestic sphere also presents major theoretical challenge. 
The key question that emerges from a consideration of sovereignty’s place in an era 
characterised by process of globalisation is whether, at a time when sovereignty is 
clearly either being transformed or eroded, it any longer makes sense to conceive of 
national political and policy-making processes as if they were sovereign and 
autonomous? 
 
This paper will argue that it does not. While the notion of sovereignty remains a 
useful ideal-type and indicative of important potential qualities of states, it frequently 
gives a highly misleading picture of the reality of state power as it is currently realised 
across a range of highly differentiated national jurisdictions. Whatever sovereignty is 
taken to be, one would intuitively expect the United States to have a qualitatively and 
quantitatively different capacity to realise it than say, Laos. Revealingly, the conduct 
of the Vietnam War – in which these countries played conspicuous parts - reminds us 
that powerful countries have the capacity to fundamentally comprise the sovereignty 
of less powerful ones. Dramatic as such endlessly extendable examples may be, they 
are hardly unprecedented. By contrast, the challenge presented to national sovereignty 
by the multifaceted forces of globalisation is not simply novel, it is more insidious, 
relentless, and capable of affecting  even the most powerful economies and 
sophisticated polities. Indeed, one of the great ironies of globalisation is that the those 
states that preside over the most developed economies and have the greatest capacity 
to influence the international system are helping to create an international order that is 
ultimately inimical to their own state sovereignty. 
 
In the case of the leading powers, especially the US, any globalisation-induced 
erosion of state sovereignty may be compensated for by the expectation of enhanced 
economic development and the capacity to shift the cost of adjustment in the new 
international economic order onto other countries. For some of the these other 
countries, however, especially those faced with the twin challenges of economic 
development and political consolidation, there is no direct compensation for the loss 
of sovereignty. On the contrary, for local political elites globalisation and the erosion 
of state sovereignty present the possibility that problems of national economic 
management and development will be compounded as new institutional structures and 
actors steadily assume responsibility for, or a capacity to influence, crucial areas of 
policy and decision-making. And yet defenders of sovereignty’s continuing empirical 
presence and theoretical utility argue that threats to state autonomy actually make 
sovereignty more important  rather than less (see, for example, Werner and de Wilde 
2001). This paper examines the status of sovereignty in contemporary Southeast Asia 
and suggests that there is little evidence to support such claims in that part of the 
world.  
 
By looking at the impact that changes in the international system are having on the 
non-core, developing economies - where the idea of sovereignty has frequently  been 
a jealously guarded and fundamental part of regional political practices (Clapham 
1999) - the threats to, and changing nature of, sovereignty are thrown into sharp relief. 
It will be suggested that sovereignty has been so compromised in Southeast Asia that 
it no longer provides a useful conceptual framework within which to understand the 
actions of state and non-state actors in the region. If we want to understand who has 
the power to make effective decisions in a Southeast Asian context, we need to focus 
on authority rather than sovereignty. Consequently, the first part of the paper looks at 
the concept of sovereignty and the way it has been undermined by globalisation. The 
second part of the paper looks at the Southeast Asian experience and explains why the 
notion of authority provides a more appropriate way of conceptualising political 
activity in the region. 
 
Sovereignty and Globalisation 
 
The modern state is a sovereign state. It is, therefore, independent in the face of other 
communities. It may infuse its will towards them with a substance which need not be 
affected by the will of any external power. It is, moreover, internally supreme over the 
territory it controls. It issues orders to all men and all associations within that area; it 
receives orders from none of them. Its will is subject to no legal limitation of any kind. 
What it proposes is right by the mere announcement of intention. (Laski ([1925] 1967). 
 
Writing in 1925, and focussing primarily on the major powers of Europe which, 
despite the ravages of the First World War, remained  key actors in a system 
dominated by a relatively small number of ‘developed’, imperial nations, Laski’s 
definition may have made a good deal of sense. Now, when the international system is 
not only populated by a far larger number of independent nations - many of which 
emerged from the decolonisation process with varying strengths and capacities1 - but 
which has also been transformed by major changes in the way international commerce 
is organised and managed by supra-national institutions, such a definition looks 
inappropriate and anachronistic. Remarkably enough, however, the structural 
metamorphosis of ‘the real world’ has generally had surprisingly little impact on the 
way international relations are conceptualised  at a formal, theoretical level. Within 
the discipline of International Relations, at least, sovereignty remains a key organising 
principle. To see why it continues to occupy such a prominent place and to understand 
the nature of the changes and challenges that have been generated in the international 
system, it is important to clarify how this master concept is understood. 
 
 
Sovereignty 
 
The origins and history of sovereignty are intimately connected with the history and 
development of the state. F. H. Hinsley (1986: 220) claimed that ‘it is the state which 
wields sovereignty, and that structure, notional or tangible, which possesses it is by 
definition the state’. The political system that began to develop in Western Europe 
some one thousand years ago was based on the emergent nation-state form, and a 
consequence of the complex interplay of economic development and the organisation 
of large-scale violence (Tilly 1990). While the ultimate triumph of what we now 
recognise as the modern state form may not have been inevitable, its capacity to 
encourage and facilitate economic expansion, and thus underpin military superiority, 
proved decisive in eliminating potential alternatives and consolidating the state’s 
position as the primary unit in a system of inter-national relations (Spruyt 1994). 
Crucially, as alternative forms of political organisation and authority were gradually 
eliminated, the modern state ‘tightened up the inside/outside construction of world 
politics’  (Buzan and Little 2000: 245). The multiple forms of religious, traditional, 
and aristocratic power that existed in the decaying feudal institutions were pushed 
aside by the more organisationally coherent, territorially delimited nation states. The 
Westphalian settlement of 1648 marked the consummation of this process and the 
formal establishment of a commonwealth of sovereign states that were defined by 
their mutually recognised internal authority and their external independence (Watson 
1992: 186).  
 
While this may be a familiar story, it is important to recognise that even at its 
inception the emergent system of nation states was characterised by major disparities 
in the capacities of states; for some of the smaller European states, sovereignty was 
juridical rather than empirical.2 In other words, some states were – and are – creations 
of, and dependent on, the inter-state system itself for their continuity, legitimacy and 
status as sovereign entities. As we shall see, the highly circumscribed realisation of 
state power and authority in Southeast Asia reveals noteworthy deviations from the 
ideal-type of juridical state authority, and has led some observers to describe such 
countries as enjoying ‘quasi’, rather than complete sovereignty (Jackson 1990).  
 
One of the most eloquent defenders of the continuing theoretical and pragmatic 
importance of sovereignty, Stephen Krasner, also acknowledges that sovereignty has 
never been either complete or unchallenged. However, this does not mean, he 
contends,  that sovereignty is being fundamentally transformed by globalisation - or 
anything else for that matter. In support of this argument he distinguishes between 
four distinct uses of the notion of sovereignty: ‘interdependence sovereignty’ is the 
ability of governments to control activities within and across borders. ‘Domestic 
sovereignty’ is the organisation of authority within a particular polity. ‘Westphalian 
sovereignty’ refers to the exclusion of external authority. ‘International legal 
sovereignty’ refers to mutual state recognition (Krasner 1999: 35). These distinctions 
are important and alert us to three possibilities: first, the construction and operation of 
sovereignty necessarily has highly contingent qualities; second, authority is the 
defining quality of effectively realised sovereignty; third, a number of these notional 
qualities of sovereignty are no longer realisable, even by the most powerful states. All 
of these points merit further explication. 
 
The first point to emphasise, then, is that not only does the principle of sovereignty 
effectively demarcate and define distinctive and different political communities and 
modes of social organisation (Walker 1993: 62), but the very notion of what 
sovereignty means across time and space differs as a consequence, and may be subject 
to change – especially at times of crisis (Barkin and Cronin 1994: 108).3 If 
sovereignty and the inter-state system of which it is so integral a part is, in essence, a 
‘complex of rules’ that govern reciprocal state behaviour (Bull 1977: 70), then there is 
clearly a potential for such socially constructed rules to change in ways that reflect 
specific configurations of  internal institutions and the capacity of states to shape the 
external system in which they are embedded. The construction of an international 
order replete with supra-national institutions of governance, of which sovereignty 
itself remains an important element, consolidates what Reus-Smit (1999: 15) calls a 
‘generative structure’ that is itself reflective of key metavalues. The ability of 
individual states or, as we shall see, non-state actors, to provide the conceptual 
grammar for such a normative discourse is a crucial determinant of what the 
underlying generative structure looks like and how concepts like sovereignty are 
understood and operationalised  Although individual countries and institutions will 
have different capacities to influence the construction of the rules and norms that 
govern behaviour in the international system, what is noteworthy about the 
contemporary international order is that some of ‘the most important structures in 
which states are embedded are made of ideas, not material forces’ (Wendt 1999: 309).  
 
The suggestion that the international system is a potentially fluid environment in 
which even the most seemingly fundamental ‘structures’ are to some extent 
discursively realised through the inter-subjective generation of meta-norms and 
values, raises important questions about the continuing theoretical status of key 
concepts like sovereignty. If sovereignty means different things in different 
circumstances because of the highly contingent capacities of individual states, or 
because of the overarching normative order in which states and sovereignty are  
embedded, its status as the universal ontological bedrock of international relations 
theory, let alone practice, looks increasingly dubious. Despite the emergence of global 
processes, therefore, we need a need a different, more nauanced conceptual 
vocabulary to understand the differential impact such processes have on regions like 
Southeast Asia. 
 
Globalisation and authority 
 
The concept of globalisation has generated heated debate and a voluminous literature 
that inevitably refects the disciplinary orientations and prejudices of the various 
protagonists. There is no intention of attempting to review this literature here. For the 
purposes of this essay it will suffice to mention briefly some of the key factors that 
feature prominently in discussions of globalisation that are important as far as issues 
of state sovereignty are concerned. 
 
Held et al’s (1999: 16) succinct definition of globalisation is as useful a starting point 
as any: 
 
[Globalisation is]  a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in 
the spatial organization of social relations and transactions … generating 
transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the 
exercise of power. 
The key qualities of globalisation, therefore, are its social basis, its economic and 
political dimensions, and the fact that it is integrating a range of hitherto nationally 
demarcated activities across state borders. One of the most dramatic manifestations of 
these interconnected phenomena has been the increased economic scale and political 
importance of transnational corporations (TNCs), which have exploited developments 
in communications, transport and the organisation of the production process itself to 
radically transform the underlying logic of production in the ‘real’ economy  (Ruigrok 
and van Tulder 1995). Simultaneously, there has been a similarly profound 
transformation of the financial sector, which has become increasingly sophisticated, 
massive, and integrated across national borders (Cohen 1996). Arguably of even 
greater long-term significance, however, has been the increasing prominence of a 
range on inter-governmental and non-state actors that have emerged to help manage 
an international system that is quite simply beyond the capacity of individual states to 
organise or provide the requisite infrastructure necessary to coordinate economic 
activity beyond national borders (Cerny 1995). These changes have led some 
observers to suggest that we are witnessing the emergence of an entirely new form of 
cooperatively-based sovereignty (Chayes and Chayes 1998: 123). 
Such developments clearly do have potentially profound implications for states and 
state sovereignty. On the one hand Susan Strange has argued that the ubiquity of 
privately organised market-based activities, and the growth in scale of markets 
themselves, is leading to the ‘retreat of the state’, and a concomitant decline in state 
authority as other institutions and associations assume responsibility for roles 
formerly performed by national governments. Some states are more badly affected by 
such processes than others, leading to a ‘growing asymmetry’ between nominally 
equal sovereign states. Even more fundamentally, Strange argues, the decline of state 
power generally has exacerbated the ‘diffusion of authority away from national 
governments [and] left a yawning hole of non-authority, ungovernance it might be 
called’  (Strange 1996: 14). Persuasive as much of Strange’s thesis is, the 
international system is plainly not ungoverned. True, the international political 
economy may be prone to regular crises, especially in the financial sector, but this is 
not the same as saying  that there are not agencies and institutions  charged with 
managing the international system. What seems to be happening is that those area of 
authoritative activity that were formerly considered to be the preserve of states and 
manifestations of sovereignty, are increasingly falling under the purview of, and 
associated with, the legitimate authority of international organisations (Williams 
2000: 573; Hurd 1999: 400-401). 
An alternative reading of the contemporary international order, therefore, is one that 
emphasises the emergence of ‘governance without government’, in which the 
maintenance of global order is dependent upon the inter-subjective recognition of 
prevailing norms that shape behaviour and which require the active participation of 
‘rule-oriented institutions and regimes [to] enact and implement policies inherent in 
the ideational and behavioural patterns’ (Rosenau 1992: 14). Put differently, 
governance or the management of a specific international order involves the 
legitimate participation of a range of actors in addition to the state. Rosenau (1997: 
39) has suggested that this multi-actor world in which states are only one - albeit 
highly important – participant, may best be thought of as being marked by ‘spheres of 
authority’, which are distinguished by the existence of actors with the capacity to 
‘evoke compliance when exercising authority’.  
The potential efficacy of such an authority-centred analysis is highlighted by Cutler et 
al’s (1999: 4) study of private authority in international affairs. They demonstrate how 
private sector firms are taking responsibility from governments in specific issue areas 
where they claim particular expertise, or where governments are ‘abandoning’ 
responsibility because of ‘ideology, globalisation, or a lack of state capacity’.  
Whether it is the regulation of on-line commerce, the management of intellectual 
property issues, or the impact ratings agencies have on government policies, there is 
clearly an increasingly large number of areas where governments either choose to, or 
are forced to share authority with unelected actors from the private sector. As the very 
basis of the international economy shifts toward more intangible forms of 
‘information capitalism’, and as the associated regulatory issues seem set to become 
ever more dependent on complex, pervasive webs of influence that include extensive 
private sector expertise, the more diffuse nature and importance of shared spheres of 
authority looks likely to become entrenched (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). 
The great advantage of a theoretical approach which focuses on authority rather than 
sovereignty is that it allows us to identify the actors or institutions that have ultimate 
decision- or rule-making responsibility, rather than assuming a priori that this 
capacity will reside with states. As Thomson (1995: 223) rightly points out, authority 
is fundamentally about ‘rule-making and control, [and] rule enforcement’, but she is 
wrong to suggest that this does not have implications for state sovereignty. Certainly 
(some) states may ultimately have the power to make authoritative decisions ‘in the 
last instance’, to borrow an apposite bit of Marxist phraseology, but the point is that 
such critical decisions are likely to be few and far between. In an environment where 
private sector participation is not only seen as legitimate and welcome, but in which 
the very basis of national political communities and responsibilities have been 
fundamentally unbundled from nationally demarcated territory (Ruggie 1993), then 
there is no longer any basis for supposing that national sovereignty occupies a pivotal 
position – practically or theoretically.  
For such reasons even some of the most sophisticated and insightful attempts to 
grapple with the implications of globalisation’s impact on sovereignty seem 
misconceived. Kanishka Jayasuriya (1999: 446), for example, while noting that 
globalisation is ‘rupturing the internal sovereignty of the state’, suggests that this is 
leading to ‘the creation of islands of sovereignty within the state’ (Jayasuriya 1999: 
439). Evocative as this conception is, surely it would be simpler to consider this 
transformation and restructuring of power as part of a wider process in which 
authority is being redistributed between state and non-state actors, not as something 
that is either exclusive to states or necessarily  a property of sovereignty. After all, if 
sovereignty means anything, it is about the capacity of state as a whole to exert its 
power, not simply its capacity to achieve a degree of authority over discrete issue 
areas. Reinicke (1998: 7) attempts to overcome this problem by positing ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ forms of sovereignty, but is forced to concede that globalisation 
compromises the external variety of sovereignty, while domestic economic 
restructuring and new networks of corporate and financial power ‘challenge’ the 
operational dimension of internal sovereignty. A more fruitful way forward, perhaps, 
is to develop more detailed pictures of the way authority is divided between states and 
non-state agencies, an approach that may allow us to accommodate the paradoxical 
possibility that while the sovereignty of states has been undermined, the sphere of 
authority of more powerful states has actually expanded with the general expansion of 
the inter-state system and globalisation in particular (Boli and Thomas 1999: 48). 
Given that even those who continue to utilise the notion of sovereignty do so in ways 
that modify its essential state-based properties and implicitly raise questions about its 
universal applicability, there is a powerful argument for simply abandoning its use – 
other than as the most general descriptor or in a fairly narrow security context. In the 
second part of this paper I shall consider the nature of sovereignty in Southeast Asia 
and argue that not only has it always been partial, derivative and incompletely 
realised, but its empirical prospects and theoretical salience look increasingly tenuous. 
Sovereignty in Southeast Asia 
The countries of Southeast Asia provide an especially illuminating space within 
which to examine the continuing theoretical relevance and empirical significance of 
sovereignty. Even a cursory historical survey of the region reminds us that not only is 
the idea of sovereignty a relatively recent innovation in Southeast Asia and a product 
of the decolonisation process, but that it has assumed a distinctive form. Initially, at 
least, sovereignty was a mechanism for structuring the international relations between 
core and periphery and thus a central component of colonial domination. Strang 
(1996: 25) argues that non-Western forms of sovereignty were effectively de-
legitimated by the colonial powers, forcing the incorporation of vast areas of the 
world into an international political and economic order that was dominated by, and 
primarily run for the benefit of, a handful of imperial powers. Yet despite this rather 
brutal introduction into an emergent global system, the nations of Southeast Asia have 
generally taken to the idea of sovereignty with alacrity. 
Desperately seeking sovereignty 
The Second World War and its aftermath inaugurated a profound re-configuring of  
Southeast Asia’s strategic, political and ultimately economic order. The eventual 
expulsion of the colonial powers may have been hastened by the Second World War 
and Japan’s military intervention in Southeast Asia, but the beginnings of the Cold 
War created an especially challenging environment for the fledgling states of the 
region. The newly independent nations of Southeast Asia were faced with the twin 
challenges of nation building and economic development in a region where power had 
traditionally been associated with personalised forms of rule over people rather than 
places (Tarling 1998: 47). The new, arbitrary geographical demarcation that defined 
the emergent states of the region made the problem of creating a sense of national 
unity that much more difficult, and the integrity of the state that much more tenuous 
as a consequence. In such circumstances, the sovereignty conferred on the region as a 
result of their acceptance into the existent international-state system as newly 
independent nations provided at least a juridical reinforcement of their status. Even 
quasi-sovereignty was better than no sovereignty at all;  it helped legitimate new 
political elites and consolidate nascent states. What really distinguishes the Southeast 
Asian region, however,  is the way in which states have attempted to reinforce that 
sovereignty, particularly in response to overarching strategic concerns. 
The interaction between large-scale violence and political power that was such a 
feature of the European developmental experience, had its counterpart in Southeast 
Asia. But the Southeast Asian experience was transmuted by the pre-existence of 
established military powers in ways that imparted variegated effects on the region. 
Although the Cold War would ultimately devastate the countries of Indochina, 
rendering any notion of effective sovereignty completely meaningless, for some of 
their Southeast Asian neighbours, the Cold War had beneficial impacts.4 In the early 
phases of the Cold War the United States in its new position of aspirant global 
hegemon supported independence movements, like Indonesia’s, in spite of opposition 
from the former colonial powers – as long as they were anti-communist, of course 
(McMahon 1999). But as the Cold War became a seemingly fixed and ubiquitous part 
of the global strategic order in the 1960s, those nations of Southeast Asia fortunate 
enough not to find themselves in direct conflict with the US began to look for ways of 
shoring up their own strategic positions without compromising their still tenuous 
empirical sovereignty.  
One of the most important and enduring initiatives in this regard was the 
establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which, unlike 
comparative institutional developments amongst the countries of the European Union, 
was designed to protect national sovereignty, rather than pool it for some putative 
greater good. Indeed, the five original members5 were united by their ‘need to 
consolidate their authority as states’ (Bessho 1999: 41). One of the most important 
mechanisms for achieving this was the principle of non-interference which, as 
Acharya (2001: 57) points out, is a phenomenon that ‘can only be understood in the 
context of the domestic security concerns of the ASEAN states’. Importantly, the 
purposes to which state power were put, and the manner in which it was consolidated, 
were not timeless expressions of some essential and ubiquitous sovereign imperative, 
but contingent reflections of Southeast Asia’s unique geo-political position. 
Sovereignty, in other words, even where it remains a meaningful indicator of state 
capacity and independence,  is not only variable in degree, it is also constructed and 
constituted in highly distinctive ways that reflect ideational as well as material 
factors.6 
Significantly, security concerns in post-war East Asia have not only been preoccupied 
with more conventional concerns about external dangers, especially those revolving 
around the conduct of the Cold War in Asia, but also by domestic by threats to the 
stability of the state itself (Algappa 1998). Indonesia and the Philippines are the most 
prominent exemplars of countries that continue to be plagued by insurrectionary 
movements that challenge or refuse to recognise the legitimacy of the state. In such 
circumstances, the possibility that state elites might link up with other countries 
facing similar challenges, and attempt to minimise external threats so that domestic 
issues could be privileged without fear of unwelcome ‘interference’ in internal affairs, 
was attractive and a major factor behind ASEAN’s longevity.  
And yet because many of the states of Southeast Asia have been and remain ‘weak’, 
lacking in infrastructural capacity,7 and with a compromised and dependent form of 
sovereignty at best, they have been unable to resolve regional security issues 
definitively or act independently. Even where ASEAN played a prominent role in 
resolving the conflict in Cambodia, for example, this owed much to the willingness of 
the great powers – especially the US and China – to allow ASEAN to make the 
running on an issue in which their interests overlapped (Narine 1998). Similarly, even 
before the US launched its ‘war on terrorism’, sceptics doubted whether the ASEAN 
Regional Forum would be able to influence the major powers – especially China – in 
ways that suited ASEAN’s interests (Huxley 1996: 46). Recent events, and the US’s 
subsequent insistence that other nations clearly identify where they stand in relation to 
the support of anti-American activities, highlights just how vulnerable the region as a 
whole is to the US when it decides to assert itself in pursuit of its own perceived 
national interests (Gilley 2001).  Indonesia’s situation illustrates just how acutely 
discomfiting this prospect is as it tries not to alienate either foreign investors or 
important domestic lobbies, and reminds us that achieving national security is indeed 
‘comprehensive’ and multi-faceted process.8 
The notion of sovereignty may serve as a useful broad-brush indicator of what an 
independent nation might look like or aspire to be in the realm of security. But it is 
striking that, despite Southeast Asia’s notable enthusiasm for the concept, it has 
proved elusive even in an area where both the ‘national interest’ and thus sovereignty 
itself should be most readily apparent. If the notion of sovereignty remains 
problematic from a security perspective, however, it is of even less utility in the 
context of the region’s distinctive political-economy. 
The political-economy of Southeast Asian sovereignty 
The recent financial crisis that began Southeast Asia in 1997, the legacy of which 
continues to constrain the developmental prospects of the region, dramatically 
highlighted just how dependent and exposed the countries of Southeast Asia were to 
changes in the wider global economy (Beeson 2001a). Moreover, subsequent attempts 
at crisis management demonstrated just how vulnerable some Southeast Asian 
economies were to the interventions of both powerful external actors like the US, and 
to a range of increasingly influential intergovernmental agencies like the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and private sector institutional investors. There is no intention 
of providing an exhaustive review of the crisis or its impact on the region,9 but a few 
salient points merit emphasis. 
The first general point to make about the position of the countries of Southeast Asia 
from a political–economy perspective is that they are relatively small economically, 
and highly dependent on foreign investment and continuing access to key 
international markets. Indeed, the recent downturn in the US economy demonstrates 
just how vulnerable they remain to forces that are simply beyond their control 
(Holland 2001). But even before this latest cyclical downturn, the course of 
industrialisation in Southeast Asia and the way those economies had been integrated 
into regional and global production structures had been profoundly influenced by East 
Asia’s dominant economy - Japan  (Beeson 2001b). The capacity to decide precisely 
what sort of economic development might occur, what sort of technology might be 
applied, and under what circumstances national economic processes might be plugged 
into global production structures was inevitably compromised by a dependence on 
Japan for key inputs (Hatch and Yamamura 1995). Compounding this dependent 
position was the fact that many of what had been  lucrative niches in the global 
economy were already occupied by countries that industrialised earlier, significantly 
reducing economic returns even where later entry proved possible (Kaplinsky  
2000).10 In sum, not only did national governments in the region generally have a 
limited capacity to influence the course of national economic development, but even 
where development occurred it did so within the overarching framework of a global 
economic structures that effectively determined its course and content.  
If the preconditions for economic autonomy and sovereignty are compromised in the 
‘real’ economy, in the financial sector the problems are even more acute. One of the 
most significant policy innovations in the Southeast Asian region over the last decade 
or so has been the opening up of the region’s financial sectors – something than not 
only contributed to the crisis itself, but which has left many regional governments 
unable to make authoritative decisions about key aspects of economic policy. Most 
immediately, the governments in Southeast Asia became increasingly reliant upon, 
and unable to control, massive inflows of capital that underpinned the region’s rapid 
economic development, but which left national economies exposed to powerful 
external forces which controlled such flows. Southeast Asia succumbed to the 
ideational hegemony of the times, which decreed that the benefits of financial 
liberalisation outweighed any possible diminution of national autonomy.11 Not only 
were inflows of capital generally occurring between private sector actors and thus 
beyond the regulatory purview of states, but they were often authorised by a relative 
handful of ‘Emerging Market Fund Managers’ from large institutional investors who 
exercised ultimate authority over the scale and direction of capital movements 
(Winters 2000: 43). Once the crisis began to take hold, and the hitherto mutually 
rewarding relationships between reckless borrowers and imprudent lenders began to 
unravel, the impotence of number of the region’s governments and their lack of 
autonomy became painfully apparent. 
The scale of Southeast Asia’s potential dependency was epitomised by the now 
infamous image of IMF director Michel Camdessus standing over Indonesia’s former 
President Suharto as he signed up for an IMF bail-out package. Unfortunate and ill-
considered as Camdessus’s body-language may have been, it was a moment that 
captured a wider truth about the overall position of Southeast Asia: for much of the 
region the idea that governments enjoyed economic autonomy and the capacity to 
determine national policy either independently or in some putative national sovereign 
interest was always a myth. In this regard Southeast Asia’s position was not unique: 
governments everywhere were finding that globalisation was undermining the idea of 
discrete national economies with concomitant, clearly defined national interests 
(Cerny 1995; Drucker 1997). Globalisation, especially in Southeast Asia, has been 
fundamentally reconfiguring local coalitions of power and interest, and undermining 
the state’s capacity to underwrite the policy frameworks upon which such 
constellations of power depended. What was especially distinctive about Southeast 
Asia was the region’s dependence on external investment and its need for continuing 
access to the lucrative markets of North America in particular. This dependence made 
regional governments especially vulnerable to the demands of powerful external 
actors like the IMF and the US.12 Crucially, in the new post-Cold War environment in 
which geo-politics had been - at least temporarily – trumped by narrower 
considerations of national economic welfare, it was a power which the US, in 
conjunction with closely associated intergovernmental agencies, was quite willing to 
use (Beeson 1999). 
While the crisis may have had the effect of throwing these structurally embedded  
relationships into sharp relief, it is important to emphasise that there is nothing new 
about the inherently subordinate position of many Southeast Asian nations. At one 
level, the region’s incorporation into the wider global economy reflects part of a 
generalised international trend towards the embrace of financial liberalisation, 
privatisation and the other staples of the so-called Washington consensus (see 
Williamson 1994). What is striking about Southeast Asia is that its incorporation into 
the international financial order has generally occurred without the sort of appropriate 
regulatory oversight that might have rendered  the recent crisis, if not avoidable, then 
at least more independently manageable (see Griffith-Jones and Kimmis 1999).13 At 
another, more immediate and distinctive level, however, the ‘developing’ status of the 
Southeast Asian nations and their potentially pivotal strategic position, have made 
them important clients of influential agencies like the World Bank (Caufield 1996).14 
The historical development experiences of Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines in 
particular have been bound up with the wider evolution of a specific global geo-
political order, one that has had major impacts on both domestic development and on 
individual state capacities to determine national and foreign policies.  
The Southeast Asian experience dramatically highlights the way in which 
globalisation ‘undermines the nation-state theory of government and replaces it with a 
new concept of governance’ (Palan 2000: 157). Governance is something that is 
increasingly characterised by cooperation between states, and between states and non-
state actors.  What is distinctive about Southeast Asian nations, of course, is that they 
have very little capacity to influence the transnational environment in which such 
activities occur. In short, they are rule takers not rule makers, and this has major 
implications for the way they are incorporated into the wider global political-
economy. In a Southeast Asian context, this transformation in the mode of 
international governance also has implications for the domestic position and 
legitimacy of the state itself, and thus any claims to sovereign status. 
The domestic bases of sovereignty 
 
When considering the domestic bases of sovereignty in Southeast Asia, it is should be 
re-emphasised that state sovereignty was not only a product of the region’s integration 
into the overarching international order, but its subsequent continuation has been 
dependent upon and shaped by powerful external forces. The specific integration of 
the region’s nation-states into the wider global system has exerted a profound and 
continuing influence on the individual political-economies of the region.  In the 
Philippines, for example, the overarching strategic imperatives of the Cold War 
generally and the interventionist activities of agencies like the World Bank and the 
US in particular, facilitated the emergence of a ‘predatory oligarchy and a patrimonial 
state’ (Hutchcroft 1998: 11), which oversaw the systematic looting of the Philippine 
economy;  the state itself became a vehicle for private wealth accumulation, rather 
than an independent, sovereign  entity.15  While the Philippines may provide the most 
extreme deviation from the ideal-typical depiction of ‘the state’ operating 
independently of ‘the economy’ in Southeast Asia, it is hardly an atypical aberration. 
In Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, political and economic power have been 
intimately connected in ways that inevitably compromise the nature of state 
sovereignty.16  
 
Consequently, globalisation poses a threat to the governments of Southeast Asia that 
is more acute than for developed economies. The legitimacy and concomitant 
authority of regional governments has been highly dependent upon their perceived 
ability to oversee continuing rapid economic development (Case 1995). As authority 
is being transferred from states to other actors, and as the ability of states to control, 
let alone successfully manage, economic activity is increasingly compromised in 
Southeast Asia, then the capacity of states to act independently and effectively is 
being systematically undermined. Compounding this problem is the fact that a number 
of the region’s states are attempting - and being actively encouraged - to make a 
simultaneous transition to more democratic modes of governance. While the demise 
of authoritarian rule – if it occurs – may be welcome, the realisation of popular 
sovereignty, in which national governments reflect the democratically expressed will 
of the people looks a remote prospect. Popular sovereignty of this sort is dependent on 
the publicly authorised use of power circumscribed by a legitimately endorsed legal 
infrastructure (Haberamas 1997: 169). Not only is there often an absence of a 
regulatory framework of this sort in Southeast Asia, but even where a developed legal 
infrastructure exists, it may often be an instrument of political repression rather than 
emancipation (Jayasuriya 2002). More fundamentally in the longer term, however,  
any democratic transition that is taking place is doing so at a time when  
 
decisions taken by quasi-regional or quasi-supranational organizations such as … the 
IMF diminish the range of decisions open to national ‘majorities’. The idea of a 
community that rightly governs itself and determines its own future – an idea that is at 
the very heart of the democratic polity itself -  is, accordingly,  deeply problematic. Any 
simple assumption in democratic theory that political relations [between national 
decision-makers and the recipients of political decisions] are, or could be, 
‘symmetrical’ or ‘congruent’ appears unjustified (Held 1995: 17).  
 
The political-economies of Western Europe have developed sophisticated political 
responses to the challenge of  globalisation that have helped keep the EU at the apex 
of an international economic hierarchy; strategies that are predicated on pooling 
sovereignty and integrating markets (Moravsik 1998). Although some progress has 
been made in the latter area in Southeast Asia, 17 there is a continuing reluctance to 
jeopardise further an already compromised national sovereignty. Indeed, there is a 
recognition amongst some of the more vocal regional critics of greater economic 
integration that even this aspect of globalisation presents a major challenge to 
economic independence and autonomous development (Hewison 2001). Malaysia’s 
recent attempts to retain a degree of national economic autonomy and thus 
sovereignty need to be seen in the context of concerns about the erosion of domestic 
political authority and the dominance of external economic actors (Beeson 2000). 
While such efforts may not have been entirely successful, it is significant that they 
were undertaken within the context of continuing authoritarian rule. While this does 
not necessarily imply that the retention of minimal sovereignty and decision-making 
authority is dependent on the continuation of authoritarianism, it does suggest that 
democratic consolidation and the achievement of something even remotely like 
popular sovereignty will be made that much more difficult in a region especially 
exposed to the vicissitudes of a global economy.18 Even if political liberalisation is 
achieved, the governments of the region will still have to confront the fundamental 
challenge the increased influence of private authority poses for democratic 
governments everywhere (Coleman and Porter 2000:381). 
 
The rapidly changing circumstances that obtain in much of Southeast Asia, especially 
the multiple challenges to state legitimacy, and the limited capacities of regional 
states either to act decisively internally or to influence their external environments, 
means that the domestic basis of sovereignty is more precarious than ever. Indeed, 
one of the great paradoxes of the Southeast Asian situation is that sovereign stability 
is found not within the domestic sphere where the state exercises unchallenged power, 
but in the supposedly anarchical inter-state system, where International Relations 
theory would have us believe there is no ultimate or external authority. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Sovereignty in Southeast Asia has always been precarious, imperfectly realised, and 
the product of that region’s often troubled relationship with ‘the West’. As a an ideal 
type or a way of judging the comparative capacity of states to act effectively in 
particular issue areas, the notion of sovereignty retains some heuristic value. But to 
assume that states are either likely to behave in similar ways because of some 
essential internal qualities, or to ignore the powerful external constraints that 
ultimately shape the actions of even the most powerful states, is to wilfully ignore the 
deeply inter-connected domestic and international aspects of the contemporary global 
political economy. 
 
Rather than persist with a concept of limited explanatory power, I have argued that 
studying the exercise of authority provides a more useful and illuminating framework 
within which to consider that relative power of not just states, but the other actors that 
increasingly determine political and economic outcomes. For, despite the hyperbole 
that occasionally accompanies discussions of globalisation, it is by now clear that we 
do live in an era that is characterised by distinctive qualities (Higgott 1999). Even if 
such qualities are characterised primarily by their intensity and extensity rather than 
by their complete novelty (see Held et al 1999), it should not come as a complete 
surprise if the conceptual tools that provided satisfactory explanations for the 
activities of European states and economies in the nineteenth century may not be quite 
as convincing in the twenty-first.  
 
The Southeast Asian experience demonstrates that, even for those observers that 
continue to take sovereignty seriously, some states are plainly more sovereign than 
others. To explain the continuing existence of this inequitable distribution of power in 
the international system, we need to look not at sovereignty, but at which actors have 
the power to make authoritative decisions, both internationally and domestically. For 
the continuing focus on sovereignty obscures as much at the national level as it does 
at the international: Southeast Asia also reminds us that the exercise of power is a 
highly contested process at the domestic level, too, one in which control of the state 
itself has been one of the most keenly sought prizes. In the contemporary era, 
however, control of the state – even over the less extensive state apparatuses of 
Southeast Asia - is never complete or unchallenged, and its capacity to act decisively 
is, in any case, increasingly constrained. When empirical sovereignty is evermore 
difficult to realise, and when juridical sovereignty is no guarantee of international 
autonomy, it may be wise to find better ways of conceptualising the complex relations 
that exist between states, societies and the wider external environment in which they 
are embedded. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
Endnotes 
 
1 The idea of state capacity is useful way of conceptualising and measuring the ability of governments 
to implement policy. Without which such a capacity  the idea of sovereignty becomes rather 
meaningless. State capacity here is understood as ‘its freedom to take decisions, its ability to take 
informed decisions, and its ability to have those decisions implemented’ (Polidano 2000:809). 
2 Juridical sovereignty refers to the recognition by other states of sovereign statehood. Empirical 
sovereignty refers to the ability of a group to control or administer a particular territory. In many parts 
of the developing world, states have survived largely because of juridical sovereignty. See Jackson and 
Rosberg (1982). 
3 This is quite the reverse of the claim made by Werner and de Wilde (2001) noted earlier and more in 
keeping with historical experience. 
4 For an insightful overview of the impact of warfare generally and the Cold War in particular in East 
Asia, see Stubbs (1999). 
5 Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. 
6 For an exploration of the way this process has worked in the context of Southeast Asia’s most 
important security organisation, the ARF, see Hill and Tow (2002). 
7 ‘Infrastructural power’ refers to the ‘institutional capacity of a central state, despotic or not, to 
penetrate its territories and logistically implement decisions’ (Mann 1993: 59). In this regard, it should 
be emphasised, Southeast Asian states generally had significantly less capacity than their counterparts 
in Northeast Asia. 
8 Security in Asia is often assumed to assume a more ‘comprehensive’ form because of the 
incorporation of economic and political considerations that are generally not part of narrower 
‘Western’ conceptions. See Algappa (1998). 
9 There is a vast literature on the crisis and its aftermath by now. See the collection by Robison et al 
(2000) for an overview that contains chapters on individual Southeast Asian countries. 
10 Singapore is, of course, an important exception to the generalised Southeast Asian experience, 
having industrialised earlier and established a favourable position in the region’s production hierarchy. 
However, it should be noted that not even Singapore has proved immune from the latest economic 
downturn and remains highly exposed to global developments over which it has no control. See 
Saywell (2001). 
11 Although beyond the scope of this essay, it is worth noting that the dominance of financial capital 
reflected long-term changes in the global-political economy that consolidated the political power of the 
holders of mobile financial assets and made any deviation from the IFI-supported orthodoxy 
increasingly unlikely and costly. See Strange (1998). 
12 Despite the fact that reform initiatives may not have transformed Southeast Asia’s political-
economies in the way some of their architects may have hoped, the scale and depth of the reforms that 
agencies like the IMF were insisting upon in Indonesia in particular is significant, revealing, and a 
continuing source of tension between ostensibly sovereign governments and influential external actors. 
See Haggard (2000). 
13 Significantly, there has been increased interest in trying to develop either an Asian currency area or 
an Asian Monetary Fund in an effort to insulate the region from future crises. Despite some imposing 
technical and political difficulties, such an idea is not infeasible. See Bayoumi and Mauro (2001). 
14 The influence of the World Bank has actually increased as the Bank is no longer constrained by 
strategic considerations and client states like Indonesia are chronically indebted and reliant on 
continuing Bank funding. See ‘World Bank warns Jakarta on sell-offs’, BBC News on-line, 5/11/2001,  
15 This is in sharp contrast with the idea that a number of East Asian states enjoyed a degree of 
‘embedded autonomy’ or insulation from vested interests – something that helps to account for both the 
compromised nature of sovereignty in much of Southeast Asia, and the region’s less impressive 
economic performance compared to Northeast Asia. See Evans (1995). 
16 For recent examinations of the individual political-economies of Southeast Asia, see Rodan, G. et al 
(2001). 
17 Economic integration in Southeast Asia has been encouraged by intra-regional trade agreements, and 
while these are still receiving widespread rhetorical support despite the crisis, it remains to be seen 
                                                                                                                                            
whether they will prosper given significant political opposition, or whether they will advantage the 
Southeast Asian nations in particular if they are realised. See Bowles (2000). 
18 The East Asian region generally (with the partial exception of China) has experienced a major 
economic contraction at a time when ratios of government debt to GDP are even higher than they were 
when the original crisis hit in 1997. See ‘Warning signs’, The Economist, October 27, 2001: 75-76. 
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